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Information markets are mechanisms that allow a group of geographically dispersed participants to reach and
continuously reevaluate consensus by discovering the value of alternative outcomes. Evidence suggests that these
markets can produce better quality decisions than a small subset of selected decision makers: a finding in direct
opposition to the trust we place on expertise. In challenging and uncertain decision-making arenas, information
markets offer an interesting, and somewhat counter-intuitive approach. In practice, information markets may be
used in combination with other decision-making methods, but these market-based mechanisms offer many
advantages. This paper presents an information market typology and explores some of the challenges raised by
different market applications. Market types include event and estimation-based prediction markets, decision
markets, and idea markets. An integrated research landscape model and research propositions are presented to
help guide continuing research in this area.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The overall message of information markets is that a large group of market participants can produce better quality
decisions than a small subset of selected decision makers. This is in direct opposition to our inherent trust in
expertise. Significant specialization and training, along with deep domain knowledge, are highly valued in society.
The expert physician or diagnostician immediately leaps to mind. However, there are many areas in which the track
record of experts does not merit such high levels of trust. In these challenging and uncertain decision-making
arenas, information markets offer an interesting, and somewhat counter-intuitive approach. In practice, information
markets may be used in combination with other decision-making methods, but these market-based mechanisms
offer many advantages such as feedback and signalling, participant anonyminity, and incentivised prediction
accuracy.
Information markets are mechanisms that allow a group of geographically dispersed participants to reach and
continuously reevaluate consensus by discovering the value of alternative outcomes. The technology behind
information markets can support a large number of participants, engaging many people in the decision-making
process. The process itself is very democratic, with all participants enjoying equal access to buy and sell their
favored outcomes, typically in an anonymous market. Information markets are less expensive mechanisms than
face-to-face meetings or facilitated group consensus methodologies. In addition, markets are able to operate
continuously, thereby allowing participants to immediately respond to unfolding events. Re-pricing based on newly
available information makes markets excellent feedback mechanisms that can be integrated into more complex and
dynamic business processes.
There are many different types of information markets that accomodate a variety of decision-making tasks. Some
markets are aimed at predicting the outcome of a specific event, while other markets are used for idea generation.
Market designers have a rich pallette of options to choose from when adapting a market to a specific decision
making context.
This paper will first organize markets into a typology and define the various types. We will then provide a research
landscape model to guide future exploration of this topic area. The landscape model defines and describes the
relevant high level constructs. Finally, exemplar research propositions are presented to further explain how the
typology and research landscape model can be used in information market research.

II. INFORMATION MARKETS
Berg et al. [2003, pg. 79] define information markets ―as those run for the purpose of using the information content in
market values to make predictions about specific future events.‖ The overall goal of all information markets is to
harness the collective wisdom of the crowds. This notion is the topic of a recent book by Surowiecki [2004].
Information markets effectively aggregate the opinions of participants with vastly different backgrounds, holding
localized knowledge, who may be geographically dispersed [Sikora and Shaw 1998; Plott 2000]. There is a large
body of evidence that information markets are effective at estimating the probability of future industrial or political
events, such as shifts in monetary policy, predicting the next Supreme Court Justice to leave the bench, and
assessing various forms of geopolitical risk [Berg and Rietz 2003; Brüggelambert 2004; Gruca 2000; Herron et al.
1999; Oliven and Rietz 2004; Wolfers and Zitzewitz 2004]. The Iowa Electronic Market (www.biz.uiowa.edu/iem),
perhaps the most well-known example, has compiled an impressive record of predicting presidential elections [Berg
et al. 2001; Berg and Rietz 1996; Forsythe et al. 1992]. Several informal explanations for the success of these
markets are presented in the prediction market literature. Most notably, this literature identifies financial incentives
for accurate predictions, better-informed traders self-selecting to participate, their ability to aggregate information,
and the feedback provided by market price as critical success factors [Plott et al. 2002]. The initial popularity of
these markets to forecast election outcomes [Berg and Rietz. 2003] has spread, and their use has expanded to
many decision-making environments. Many companies have been using proprietary internal information markets for
managing Information
demand risk (Intel,
Google),Adetermining
ship dates (Microsoft), forecasting market capitalization
Markets:
Researchproduct
Landscape
prior to an IPO (Google), identifying breakthrough technologies (GE), and estimating effort for project management
(USF Milestone Market) among other tasks. Best Buy, Motorola, Qualcomm, Edmunds, and Misys Banking
Systems have used Consensus Point, a commercial information market company, for a variety of prediction
activities. Some other information markets are Economic Derivatives, News Futures, Foresight Exchange, and the
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Hollywood Stock Exchange. Predictify supports specialized and general trading on political, financial, current
1
events, sports, and entertainment questions.
This expansion in use has spawned a variety of information markets designed to elicit the changing types of
information required to reduce uncertainty. Figure 1 presents a market typology that organizes markets by the type
of decision making task. Each of these market types is aimed at a different type of task, which often leads to
different designs. There are three main categories of information markets differentiated by the type of information
sought: prediction markets, decision markets, and idea markets.

Information Markets

Prediction Markets
(Predict future events)

Event Markets
(Choice between
discrete alternatives)

Decision Markets
(Choice between
alternatives that create
the future)

Idea Futures
(Discovery of new
alternatives)

Estimation Markets
(Choice between
continuous alternatives)

Verifiable

Unverifiable

Figure 1. Information Market Typology
As indicated in Figure 1, information markets can be divided into two distinct groups based on their outcomes and
whether these outcomes are verifiable or unverifiable. Because prediction markets, by their definition, attempt to
predict the state of a specific event at some future time, the results can be verified against an actual outcome. The
outcomes of decision-and-idea markets reflect the participant's choice among alternatives or breakthrough solutions
that will not have comparable events with which the results can be verified. A more detailed description of the
various types of markets follows.

Prediction Markets
Prediction markets are concerned with forecasting the future. Because these predictions will ultimately come to
pass, the truth of the predictions can be verified. Prediction markets are an increasingly common type of market that
can be used in a wide variety of decision-making contexts. Most markets are event markets with binary, discrete and
mutually exclusive contracts, such as bidding on the winner of a presidential election. Recently, the choices and
contracts have become more complex, allowing the bidder to select from any number of possible outcomes or
outcomes that represent a continuous range of choices. Prediction markets can be further decomposed according
to the type of events being predicted.
Event Markets
Typically, event markets operate with a well-defined set of outcomes provided a priori to market traders. Through
implicit evaluation and explicit trades, the alternative outcomes are priced at varying levels, conveying the voice of
the market. In event markets, the outcomes are discrete outcomes. Which candidate will win an election? Which
team will win a game? Which of three delivery dates are most likely? The truth of these questions are ultimately
revealed as the actual events occur, changing from predictions to historical facts. The election markets conducted
by the Iowa Electronic Markets (IEM) and the Hollywood Stock Exchanges markets for expected box office returns
1

Information market Web sites include: Consensus Point [consensuspoint.com], Predictify [predictify.com], Hollywood Stock Exchange [hsx.com].
Economic Derivatives [economicderivatives.com], News Futures [us.newsfutures.com], Foresight Exchange [iedosphere.com].
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are classic examples of this type of information market. Other examples of this prevalent format are supported by a
variety of platforms such as Economic Derivatives (economicderivatives.com), Newsfutures (newsfutures.com), and
the Foresight Exchange (ideosphere.com).
Estimation Markets
Estimation markets differ from event markets in that the outcomes are points along a range. An estimation market
can be approximated by an event market by selecting a set of discrete points as a priori alternatives. While this may
be a straightforward method of handling quantitative outcomes, there is a risk of losing some useful precision and
precluding traders from selecting the truly desirable alternatives. There are many interesting situations in which a
quantitative estimation market seems like a natural fit. For example, project management revolves around time and
cost estimates that are certainly quantitative in nature. The Milestone Market (www.MilestoneMarket.org) is a
prototype market built at the University of South Florida and is being deployed for project estimation tasks.
Forecasting sales or any of a myriad of financial indicators, such as interest rates, that can affect the business
environment provide other examples of estimation markets. Plott and Chen [2002] successfully applied information
markets in a more business-oriented experiment to forecast sales volume and the level of profit sharing at HewlettPackard Laboratories. Their market results outperformed official internal sales forecasts 75 percent of the time
[Ostrover 2005]. Although in this particular market, the choices were discrete due to the functionality of the market
mechanism, the type of choices exemplify the potential of estimation markets to allow for continuous alternatives.

Decision Markets
Decision markets seek to support decision making in more uncertain environments. Typically, their goal is to decide
between alternative choices where there is not necessarily a clearly correct choice. In decision markets, traders
explicitly state their preferences for different outcomes through purchases of desired outcomes and sales of less
desirable outcomes (at particular price points). These markets help create the future because the results (the most
preferred alternative) may determine an organization‘s course of action. Prediction markets state the decision tasks
in certain terms that can be verified once the actual event takes place. This requirement is relaxed somewhat in
decision markets, which can present alternatives that may not be evaluated in black and white. For example, Intel
and Google‘s demand forecast markets, and Starwood‘s markets to develop and select marketing campaigns
represent variants of such decision markets. A decision market for selecting marketing campaigns would involve
describing in some detail fairly complex options and then proposing evaluation criteria that could be used to
determine which campaign was actually the winner. Given a limited marketing budget, it might be difficult to
thoroughly investigate the performance of each alternative so that market accuracy can be assessed. In fact, it may
be impossible to reach high levels of certainty in many decision making contexts. Yet, such decision markets can
still be very useful in determining courses of action or selecting amongst a set of alternative outcomes in less
structured domains. All that is necessary are clear descriptions of the outcomes and an evaluation method that is
perceived as fair by the participants, as well as capturing the actual usefulness of the outcomes in a practical sense.
The limitation is the uncertainty in the final assessment since in many situations the actual merit of every alternative
outcome may be unverifiable. Ultimately decision markets are only as good as the quality of the decisions in
practice.

Idea Markets
Idea markets or futures operate in even less-structured domains. The intent of idea markets is information discovery
similar to brainstorming. General Electric has recently implemented what they call an ―Imagination Market‖ to
identify breakthrough technology research areas to pursue. It is likely that many of the alternative outcomes are
never truly verified. Again, successful idea markets require good descriptions of the possible outcomes and a fair
evaluation method at the close of the market. However, the challenges involved in representing alternatives and
evaluating those alternatives in the future are more extreme. In a brainstorming environment, there must be a fairly
easy mechanism for proposing (and possibly removing) alternative ideas. For example, the GE Imagination Markets
have resulted in between 60 to 150 proposed ideas, but only around 50 ideas are actually realized [LaComb et al.
2007]. In addition, each unique idea must be accompanied by some method of evaluation. Any market-based
solution must empower all, or at least many, traders to offer alternatives. In such unstructured environments,
market management becomes critical as the tumultuous process of both idea generation and trading is combined.
At the close of the market, the evaluation of all the potentially diverse ideas presents an equally difficult set of
challenges. In the GE Imagination Market, more ideas were generated, ideas were easily visible to all who
participated, and there was more participation than traditional idea-generation techniques, but the ranking of ideas
using volume-weighted average price was no better than the rating and ranking of ideas by members of a leadership
team [LaComb et al. 2007]. Customer facing markets have emerged such as Dell's IdeaStorm [ideastorm.com]
and Starbuck's, My Starbucks Idea [mystarbucksidea.force.com] which allow participants to post, review, and vote
on product and service suggestions.
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The market typology presented in Figure 1 serves to organize the different types of markets by the type of decisionmaking task to be implemented. These market types, from event or estimation-based prediction markets to the lessstructured decision and idea markets, offer many different areas for research. However, these markets also share
some common core characteristics. Many of these core market characteristics include aspects of market
participants, general market structure, and mechanisms for rewarding traders and understanding the market outputs.
In the next section of this paper, as we consider the research landscape for information markets, we model the
relationships between seven high level constructs: trader characteristics, organization characteristics, market
environment, external information, trader behavior, market design and market outcomes. All will be relevant factors
as we study specific information markets. For example, there has already been research on how trader
characteristics impact trader behavior [e.g., Forsythe et al. 1998]. However, the typology of information markets will
require quite different conceptualizations and measures for market outcomes, which include how the voice of the
market, activities, and performance are measured. These differences for market outcomes by market type are
detailed in Table 1.
Table 1. Differences in Conceptualization and Measurement of Market Outcomes, by Market Type
Market Outcomes

Market Type
Voice of the Market
Prediction
Event
Estimation
Decision
Idea

Discrete Choice Price
Point Estimate on Continuous Curve
Price of Alternative Choices
Price Ranking of Ideas

Activity
# of Trades
# of Trades
# of Trades
# of Ideas

Market Performance
Accuracy of Prediction
Accuracy of Prediction
Subjective Evaluation of Decision
Subjective Evaluation of Realized Ideas

III. INFORMATION MARKET RESEARCH LANDSCAPE
Research into the use of information markets to assist with business decisions is rich with opportunities. This paper
presents a few of the potential research areas as they apply to a variety of information market applications. Figure 2
presents the research landscape model depicted as a model that was developed from existing information market
literature, as well as new areas for exploration outlined in this conceptual paper. The high level constructs and their
relations in the topology represent an organization of ideas from information market research. Information market
research has investigated the relationships between individual trader characteristics, market environment,
organizational characteristics, external information, market design, trader behavior, and market outcomes. Table 2
presents some examples of influential and key findings from this literature for each of the high-level constructs that
make up our research landscape model. In Figure 2 and the following text we identify instances of these high-level
constructs that have already been studied and/or appear to be highly relevant to information market research.
However, these instances are in no way intended to provide an exhaustive list. The goal of mapping the research
landscape at this stage in information market research is to help structure research efforts on information markets by
organizing the results of past studies, as well as detecting those areas that need additional work. Within the market
topology, research and development issues are separated into individual trader characteristics, organizational
characteristics, market environment, external information, trader behavior, market design, and market outcomes.
Individual trader characteristics represent individual differences along a host of dimensions that include sociodemographic items, cultural differences, risk profiles, work roles, and levels of relevant expertise. Market
environments consider the collective aspects of the traders, such as diversity and independence, as well as the type
of market, the number of participants, and the length of time the market is open. Organizational characteristics
relate to the organizational and political environment surrounding the market application. External Information
relates to the amount, availability, and accessibility of relevant information, search costs, and even insider trading
knowledge. Market design factors include the trading interface and functionality choices to accommodate the
various market types, the level of anonymity provided traders, aggregation and feedback mechanisms, as well as
decisions regarding the payoff mechanisms proposed to reward participants. All of these market constructs directly
affect trading behavior. Trader behavior is characterized by the participant‘s bidding strategy, level of participation
or engagement with the market, and how accurately they trade. Trading accuracy is measured against the ultimate
market outcome that can be assessed objectively or subjectively contingent on the market type. Additionally,
market design choices will moderate the effects of individual trader characteristics, organizational characteristics,
and market environment on trader behavior. Finally, how a trader behaves will impact the outcome of the market.
Market outcomes include the actual performance or results of the market, the volume of activity, and various other
measures that result in the market conveying the combined wisdom of the participants or the voice of the market.
The market outcomes will result in a feedback loop to the traders possibly altering their behavior. These issues are
all interesting areas of research and will to some extent determine how widely information markets can be applied.
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Table 2. Key Supporting Literature
High Level
Information Markets
Constructs
Research
Individual Trader
Forsythe et al. 1998
Characteristics
Organizational
LaComb et al. 2007
Characteristics
Market
Plott & Chen 2002
Environment
Surowiecki 2004
External
Information
Market
Design
Trader
Behavior
Market
Outcomes

Forsythe et al. 1999
Hanson 2005
Bottazzi et al. 2005
Pennock et al. 2001

Summary of Findings
Some traders exhibit judgment biases in their market
choices
Type of incentive for participation affected trader behavior
Small numbers of participants can result in acceptable
performance, but may lack diversity (variation in ideas is
needed)
In election markets, candidate debates changed trader
behavior
Anonymity minimizes traders‘ fears about expressing or
valuing ideas that conflict with status quo
Trading patterns of trend followers and noise traders
Identified determination of the voice of the market as the
most difficult challenges to information markets

Trader Characteristics
Demographics
Cultural Differences
Work Roles
Risk Profile
Domain Expertise

External Information
Availability and Quality
Accessibility
Search Costs
Insider Trading

Organization Characteristics
Business Processes
Publicity and Awareness
Rewards and Incentives
Dissemination of Results
Organizational Support
Political Environment

Trader Behavior
Trading Strategies
Participation
Accuracy of Trades

Market Outcomes
Voice of the Market
Activity (Volume)
Market Performance

Market Design
Payoff Mechanisms
Feedback Mechanisms
Anonymity of Trading
Aggregation Mechanism
Dynamic Extensibility
Interfaces/Functionality

Market Environment
Task Type
Diversity
Independence
Number of Participants
Longevity

Figure 2. Research Landscape Model

Trader Characteristics
All traders are not created equal. Trader age, individual expertise, work roles, tolerance for risk, or even experience
with online financial services may all affect participation in an information market. For example, there is a wellknown difference between cultures in power distance: the extent to which individuals expect and accept the unequal
distribution of power, and tolerate differences in a hierarchy [Hofstede 1991, 2001]. Market participants from
cultures high in power distance may be reluctant to trade, or in non-anonymous markets, may follow the trades of
individuals who have higher positions, rather than participate based on their own beliefs. Some educational
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backgrounds or work roles might result in more experience or even domain expertise. Is this more relevant
experience associated with more sophisticated estimation market trading strategies? Individuals also vary in their
tolerance for risk, which would certainly affect trading. In short, individual trader characteristics are fundamental
factors in understanding how markets might operate with a given set of traders.

Organization Characteristics
Markets do not exist in a vacuum. Markets operate in organizational and political environments that will affect
everything from market acceptance to individual trader activity. For example, a decision has to be made about how
to incorporate markets into business processes such as project management, marketing strategy decisions, or
innovation development. The structured outcomes of prediction markets may be more easily integrated into
business processes (e.g., use the market to estimate completion times at the beginning of the project and at set
intervals throughout the project) than the more complex outputs of decision or idea markets (which may be used in
conjunction with existing processes, such as forecasting or brainstorming processes). How is a trader‘s market
performance perceived within the larger context of teams and management structures? The methods used to
publicize information market applications and recognize strong performance (or to keep less inspired performance
private) are factors outside of the market itself that will cause participants to alter behaviors. Organizational support
and how the results of market applications are disseminated and used all signal the value of information market
technology to participants. Finally, the outputs of markets are used to change or enlighten existing business
processes. The nature and importance of the processes and integration efforts are also central factors.
The type and level of incentives can vary within an organization. At GE, multiple incentives are used, including small
prizes for the best idea, best portfolio of ideas, and amount of participation, as well as funding to prototype the best
idea submitted by a participant [LaComb 2007]. At Best Buy, the top trader in their prediction market for new
product sales received a $200 gift certificate [Dvorak 2008]. What is an adequate level and type of incentive to
facilitate trading, and participation? For example, the effort required to study a problem, and make an informed
decision may not be trivial. What level of incentive is necessary to prompt participants to expend the effort required
to form predictions? Are there any incentives that would cause some market participants to trade in ways that
influence the outcome in inappropriate ways? Also, what impact do various incentive structures have on trading
strategies and ultimately on the outcome of the market?

Market Environment
Applying information markets to new and interesting problems brings into play a variety of task types. The degree of
task complexity of the problem being predicted can vary significantly. Unlike a simple event market predicting the
outcome of a political campaign, where there is one correct choice among two choices, there are other markets that
involve multiple contracts that may change over time, or even participant-generated contracts. The market typology
captures much of this task complexity from well-defined prediction tasks to idea markets that are used for
brainstorming. For instance, care must be taken in the choice and description of the alternatives in estimation
markets with many contracts, or decision markets with several complex alternatives. Additionally, the market
developer must decide on the granularity of the contract ranges, what, if any, reference points to provide, and
whether or not to allow the contracts to be modified as the market progresses. Task complexity can vary within the
various market types, as well as across market types. For example, an estimation market can be used to select
alternatives from a few possible contracts or to perform more fine grained predictions using a continuous range of
alternatives.
Participant selection is a critical factor in any market, especially if the market is small or the knowledge is
specialized. Participant traits that support an effective information market include decentralization, diversity,
independence, and the number of interconnections among participants in the market [Holland 1998; Johnson 1999;
Knight 1921]. Information markets are excellent mechanisms for bringing together many decentralized ―experts‖ or
team members and subsequently sharing the group consensus through market prices. By harnessing the power of
information markets to aggregate diverse knowledge and expertise, the limitations of single-expert decision making
can be avoided. Diversity in market trader characteristics will have a direct impact on trader behavior. This is a
market characteristic, because diversity is measured in relation to other traders, and therefore, informs the selection
of traders for a specific market. Diversity of backgrounds and opinions is viewed as positive for information markets,
because differing ideas and beliefs will drive trading [Surowiecki 2004]. If everyone had the same idea or belief,
there would be no trading. All traders would desire to buy and sell the same items, therefore no trades would occur.
To facilitate a market, participants must have differing expectations regarding the value of a stock. The old adage,
―One man‘s trash is another man‘s treasure,‖ exemplifies this notion. Without trader diversity, everyone would have
the same belief and thus value their trash and treasure the same. Also the ―no-trade‖ theory suggests that adverse
selection will prevent rational uninformed agents from trading if they believe their counterparts are all informed
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agents [Milgrom and Stockey 1982]. A very diverse set of participants may interact differently from those with more
in common.
Factors such as domain expertise and trading experience may influence market behavior. Therefore, it is important
to incorporate individual traits, evolving trading experience, and other factors specific to the particular context or
market type. However, involving the ideal set of market participants is not as critical as one may expect. Including
somewhat less informed, or even completely uninformed, traders in a market adds liquidity as they may buy and sell
contracts at prices that more informed participants would hold [Plott and Chen 2002]. In fact, the attraction of
markets is that they display high levels of efficiency even though individual traders may have biases and make
mistakes [Forsythe et al. 1992; Oliven and Rietz 2004; Forsythe et al. 1999]. Participants must be free to act
independently and express their personal opinions through trading behaviors. Participants need to be free from
group pressures when forming their valuations. Independent value formation reduces the influence of dominant
opinions, one of the important advantages of information markets. While independence is necessary to foster a
unique perspective, it is also desirable to have interconnections between market participants to foster the exchange
of individual information. Although a diverse mix of traders may maximize the independence of market participants,
it may reduce the interconnectedness of those participants, which could minimize the exchange of individual
information. The impact of these influences on trading strategies, level of participation and trading accuracy needs
to be teased out.
The level of competition or the number of participants in the market, should also have an effect on trader behavior.
Berg and Rietz [1996] found that larger, more active markets with fewer contracts are more accurate. However,
reasonable performance has been demonstrated with small (i.e., thin) markets or markets with as few as 8 to 30
participants [Plott and Chen 2002; Ortner 1998]. For instance, Chen et al. [2001] successfully ran laboratory
experiments using information markets with fewer than 15 participants. However, small markets do present some
unique market design challenges. A small market is more susceptible to intentional market manipulation or the
subtle dominance of shared beliefs. Additionally, market liquidity may suffer due to a limited number of trades
offered because of the small number of participants involved. Participants must be engaged and actively trading to
generate enough data for informed estimates. Future research needs to discover if there is an effect on trading
strategies, participation and accuracy of trades with differing numbers of participants. In other contexts, idea
markets could be used as a brainstorming tool with relatively few participants or a much more widely deployed
solution to capture ―out-of-the-box‖ thinking by employees at all levels. Again, the number and type of participants
will certainly affect such markets.
The long-term nature of many information markets can be particularly troublesome. Capturing the reaction to the
changing environment is a benefit of using information markets over time, but it also poses challenges related to
task descriptions. Accommodating changes to the outcomes being traded becomes even more difficult to manage
depending on market longevity. How varying levels of complexity over time will impact trader behavior is a very
interesting and as yet unexplored question.
Many of the market environment factors noted above will directly affect market design choices, since the market
technology requirements are different for the different types of markets, or may be used to support a market
environment characteristic (e.g., anonymity of trading to maximize independence).

External Information
As the problems tackled with information markets become more complex the impact of external information that
traders possess may be influential. The knowledge a trader can use to inform market activity can be affected by
existing expertise, individual bias in how that information is processed, the ability of the trader to adequately
research and obtain publicly available information, and/or the participants‘ access to insider information. High
search costs or low information quality can force a trader to make uninformed decisions. Of course, low quality
information might even be supplied intentionally by competing traders. The notion of insider trading is particularly
significant with small markets that can fall victim to intentional manipulation by a few influential traders. Also, some
participants may have more domain knowledge regarding specific tasks. For example, in software projects a
database developer may have insight about an upcoming change to the database management system that will
affect the completion of the project that is not known by the rest of the development team. Such unique knowledge
or insights can be reflected in trading behavior that captures new or additional information quickly and the results
may influence the market outcomes.

Trader Behavior
Trading behavior can be characterized by the strategies bidders choose, their level of engagement or participation,
and how truthfully they trade. Trading truthfully implies that the bids posted reflect the bidder‘s true beliefs. Trader
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characteristics, market characteristics, access to external information, and market design all play a direct or indirect
role in influencing the behavior of market participants. Additionally, traders also react to market outcomes and
market outcomes are in turn influenced by trading behaviors. In any market, traders react to current valuations of
contracts, especially in comparison with their own valuations, in order to decide whether a buying or selling
opportunity exists.
Future studies can attempt to identify the various trading strategies adopted by participants and what effect they
have on market outcomes. Likewise, we need to discover what engages traders to actively participate in the market
and the result of differing levels of participation on individual successes and overall market accuracy. Trades should
represent the participant‘s true beliefs. We need to investigate if bidders are behaving rationally when trading in
effort estimates or other outcomes. Does the level of trading translate directly into accurate market forecasts? To
what degree do individual errors influence the voice of the market? Are trader values more elastic when predicting
outcomes of future events as compared to purchasing a material good or service? How are changes in task scope
and variability in the environment captured by the market?

Market Design
The role played by information market design features is another important research area. Choices made by market
developers during the design of the market mechanism may have a direct effect on trader behavior as well as
moderate the effects of individual trader characteristics, market environment, and organization characteristics. We
have identified six design considerations: 1) payoff mechanisms; 2) feedback instruments and notification frequency;
3) methods to aggregate the trading activity; 4) the level of anonymity afforded to traders; 5) the determination of
market closings; and 6) the basic features, functionality and appearance of the market.
For information markets to be successful contracts must be clear, easily understood, and easily adjudicated. As
participants buy and sell contracts in a market, the price of the individual contracts forecasts the probability of each
event occurring [Berg et al. 2001; Malinvaud 1974]. This equilibrium property of information markets acts as an
opinion-aggregation mechanism, with supply and demand principles illuminating the group consensus. The
feedback provided by the prevailing market prices of the contracts allows bidders to learn from the actions of other
traders and possibly modify their initial estimates. This concept is well defined in the literature on common value
auctions [Kagel and Levin 1999; Rothkopf and Harstad 1994, Dyer and Kagel 1996]. Wolfers and Zitzewitz [2004
pg. 125] suggest that prediction markets ―provide three important roles: 1) incentives to seek information; 2)
incentives for truthful information revelation; and 3) an algorithm for aggregating diverse opinions.‖
A market must provide some motivation to induce truthful trading behavior. Market participants must have the
proper incentives to fully engage in the market, as well as to trade in a forthright manner. That motivation is
normally in the form of a monetary payoff. Payoffs can be real money or virtual currency. The ―real-money‖ markets
follow the principle that forecasts will be better if traders risk their own money. However, due to regulatory issues
mainly surrounding state prohibitions on gambling, many commercial information markets have adopted the concept
of virtual currency in which participants are awarded prizes or other intrinsic rewards rather than legal tender.
Servan-Schreiber et al. [2004] compared the accuracy of information markets with real-money and virtual currency
payoffs and found no difference. Their conclusion is that real money is only one of many possible motivators such
as the thrill of competition, reputation and community bragging rights, or prizes for the best forecasters. There are a
number of potential payoff functions that can be applied to the market. For example, participants can be rewarded
for holding the most winning contracts. Other payoff methods can be based on the amount of credits (or monetary
units) a participant has accumulated (the participant‘s bank). One such method, referred to as the winner-take-all
method, specifies that the payoff for owning a share of the winning contract at the close of a market is always a
dollar ($1.00). By using this strategy, we can interpret the prices of contracts as the probabilities that it will be the
most likely outcome at market close [Jørgenson 2004]. Thus, a participant‘s payoff is depicted in Equation 1:
B
b 1

($1 pvb* )S b

(1)

if a participant owns any contracts in v* at market close and 0 otherwise. Where:
B is the set of contracts bought in outcome v*;

pvb* and Sb are the price and number of shares in any contract purchase of v*.
A participant will incur a loss equal to the amount they paid for shares in non-winning contracts.
B
b 1

( pvb* )Sb .

(2)
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The participant‘s bank is adjusted by Equation 2 and participants are either rewarded for having the largest bank or
given a monetary reward that is some fractional percentage of their bank.
Payoff functions are designed in conjunction with incentives to participate in order to reward traders, both intrinsically
and extrinsically. Research needs to be conducted to test the difference between real and play money rewards in
the new business problem domain [Servan-Schreiber et al. 2004].
We expect that feedback mechanisms, such as email alerts of changing market conditions, may have a significant
impact on trader behavior. Additionally, creating innovative new feedback artifacts may prove to be a fruitful area to
investigate. Similarly, the design of algorithms that summarize and transform trading activity into information that
can be provided as feedback to both traders and sponsors has limitless potential (and is represented explicitly in
Figure 2). The prevalent data generated by the market can show trends, the degree of consensus among
participants, and much more.
The influence of the level of anonymity afforded to traders must also be explored. This is especially important in
markets within small business units in which traders may be influenced by their close association with other traders.
It may be difficult to maintain independence in the market and/or minimize impacts on trading if there are influential
cultural factors like power distance that arise if participants are known to one another.
Market designers must choose how to accommodate unique aspects of the different tasks being predicted in the
various market types. Estimation markets present new challenges with regard to trading interfaces and other issues
such as extensibility. If there are no discrete outcome options available for trading, the market interaction becomes
more of a selection of points along a continuum. The issues to be researched include the development of engaging
human-computer interfaces that support these types of actions, how to handle potentially infinite points along the
continuum, and how to allow the trading range to be expanded or reduced while the market is active. Should there
be more general long-term estimates with closing dates well in advance of the projected contract or should the close
be dynamic? How do you account for scope creep in the choice of contracts? Should additional contracts be added
to the market if it appears that the original contracts are no longer valid or as early estimate dates expire? In most
cases the alternatives are known at the start of the market. However, one interesting challenge is to provide
mechanisms for adding alternatives while the market is active. It is quite natural for critical information to change
during the course of a market. For instance, injuries to key players may dramatically affect the prospects of a team
winning a specific game. At times it is not information about an existing outcome, rather a completely new
alternative that must be evaluated. What happens if a new candidate enters an election? The new outcome may be
simple or complex, but some method of adding the alternative to the market in a fair and equitable manner must be
provided. In other words, markets may be designed to be extensible. The challenge is to decide who can add new
alternatives, how should traders be notified, and when should trading be opened?
Idea markets also require unique design considerations. One challenge is ensuring the adequate description of
each alternative. How is the quality of the representation to be judged prior to an offering in the market and how
should modifications be handled once trading has commenced? How are new offerings entered into the market,
traders notified, and trading started or suspended in an equitable manner? How are shareholders compensated if
an idea is withdrawn? Another potential problem is determining if two ideas are the same. Market participants may
use very different approaches to describe similar ideas. How should these potential conflicts be detected and
resolved? How should the voice of the market be interpreted if two similar ideas are valued very differently? Again,
there are many human-computer interface issues and market administrative policies that would be fruitful areas for
research.
Finally, the design of the trading interfaces is critical and can draw on the many ways of organizing markets, such as
auctions, private exchanges, or more complex arrangements, such as the various financial exchanges. Whatever
the market organization, the appropriateness of the trading interface will directly affect participation. Interface issues
can be even more important in the information market arena, because participants are casual traders, not
professionals whose livelihood is linked to market use. The type of information market also places different
demands on the interface, from the ease with which someone can execute a trade to the analysis of current market
conditions. In addition, any markets that require dynamic changes to the choices will require much more involved
administrative capabilities.

Market Outcomes
The ultimate goal of using a market is to gain knowledge regarding the consensus of the participants. This
consensus is what Surowiecki [2004] refers to as the ―wisdom of the crowds.‖ The voice of the crowd, or market, is
the price of the representative contracts. Ideally, these prices should predict the true outcomes. One of the most
difficult challenges in using information markets is determining exactly what the market is saying, because there are
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many ways to aggregate the trading behaviors and prices [Pennock et al. 2001]. Plott and Chen [2002], used a
volume-weighted price average (VWPA) to determine the most valuable contract and a single estimate: the voice of
the market. The volume-weighted price average was calculated for each contract (ci) in a market with a set of
contracts (C). Let qj be the quantity of contracts purchased and let pj be the price (the number of credits paid for
each contract) in a single trade (tj). The total cost of any trade is then pjqj. Finally, the VWPA (vi) for each contract is
found by summing the cost of all trades in a contract over the sum of the share quantities (as shown below).

p jq j
vci

t j Ti
C

qi
t j Ti

C – set of contracts in the market
th
ci – the i contract in C
vi – the volume weighted price average for contract ci
T – set of trades in the market
Ti – set of trades involving contract ci (Ti
T)
th

tj – the j trade in T
pj – price per share in trade tj
qj – quantity of shares in trade tj
As noted earlier in the market design section, additional data can be collected and manipulated to provide insights
into participants‘ beliefs such as the volume, velocity, and bid ask spread of trades. Each of these variables can be
viewed at intervals or as they trend over time. The activity or volume of trades may indicate the popularity of an
estimate. Looking at the spread between pending bids and asks could be interpreted as the level of (dis)agreement
between participants‘ expectations. A longitudinal review of the trade/bid/ask history can display the belief trends.
The interpretation of the data provided by an electronic information market is unlimited. For prediction markets that
are verifiable, market performance can be measured by accuracy: how closely the voice of the market matches the
actual result of the event or estimate. For the unverifiable markets (decision and idea markets), the determination of
the voice of the market, and what constitutes activity and market performance will be somewhat different from the
verifiable markets. For the decision markets, the voice of the market will be the price of alternative choices, similar
to that for the event market, to identify the single desired choice. For the idea markets, these prices will be rank
ordered to distinguish the more valued set of ideas from those that are less valued. Activity in idea markets is
measured by the number of ideas generated, not solely by the number of trades, which is enabled by a market
design that allows dynamic extensibility. Finally, the market performance of both decision and idea markets are
measured via subjective assessment, since no actual real world outcome is available for comparison. In fact, in the
decision market, the purpose is to create the real world outcome (i.e., decide what to do).

IV. RESEARCH PROPOSITIONS
As discussed earlier, the information market research landscape is rich and varied, and there are many areas that
need investigation. In the following section, we present an example of research propositions related to each of the
constructs in our model. See Table 2 for a summary of the key constructs. The propositions demonstrate how
specific research projects can continue to contribute to our understanding of information markets.
Table 3. Summary of Propositions
High Level
Proposition
Constructs
Trader Characteristics
Proposition 1: The economic culture of individual traders will impact their trader
behavior
Organizational
Proposition 2: Organizational incentives to participate will impact the amount and
Characteristics
quality of trader participation in the information market.
Market
Proposition 3: In idea futures-type information markets, market diversity and number of
Environment
participants will impact market performance (number and quality of ideas generated).
External
Proposition 4: When new, external information is available to all market traders, those
Information
traders will differ in how that new external information impacts their trading behavior.
Market
Proposition 5: Idea markets designed for anonymous trading will generate more ideas
Design
and greater participation than non-anonymous idea markets.
Market
Proposition 6: The best method for determining the voice of the market will vary by
Outcomes
type of market.
Market
Proposition 7: Software cost estimation using information markets will be more
Outcomes
accurate than existing methods of cost estimation.
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Proposition 1: The economic culture of individual traders will impact their trader behavior.
Baumol at al. (2007) and others recognize that although most of the world‘s nations have now implemented
capitalism as their economic system, there are dramatic differences between types of capitalism. Given that
information markets are built on an information corollary to financial markets, it is unlikely that individual traders who
have only experienced their nation‘s particular form of capitalism will view the market in the same way, and
participate in the same way. For example, if individuals have only experienced the kind of state-guided or oligarchic
capitalism described by Baumol et al. (2007), then those individuals may view markets as less free and expect
market results to be dominated by established powers. This will certainly affect global markets, such as international
software development teams and the advantage of geographically dispersed participants.

Proposition 2:

Organizational incentives to participate will impact the amount and quality of
trader participation in the information market.

As discussed earlier, organizations vary in how they use incentives to participate in information markets. However, it
is currently unknown how these incentives operate, both initially and over time. Research in this area can leverage
the large body of research on incentives from organizational behavior, and in particular, cognitive evaluation theory,
which has found that tangible rewards that are contingent on performance can undermine an individual‘s existing
intrinsic work motivation [Deci et al. 1999], as well as reduce cognitive flexibility in problem solving [McGraw and
McCullers 1979] and performance on complex tasks with difficult goals [Erez et al. 1990]. In some settings, it may
be better to allow individual‘s intrinsic motivation to foster market participation.

Proposition 3:

In idea futures-type information markets, market diversity and number of
participants will impact market performance (number and quality of ideas
generated).

In prediction-type information markets, it is known that even small numbers of participants can result in acceptable
performance [Chen et al. 2001; Ortner 1998; Plott and Chen 2002]. Regardless of the number of participants,
diversity in the market is needed, in order to get variation in ideas and beliefs [Surowiecki 2004]. It is unknown how
these two market environment characteristics impact market outcomes, individually and as an interaction, in idea
futures-type markets. This is particularly important because market participation does have a cost in terms of
employees‘ time to consider the new ideas of others and create their own ideas. At GE, employees who did not
participate as well as those who did not participate very often cited as the main reason ―not enough time‖ (73
percent for non-participants, 82 percent for low-participants) [LaComb 2007]. Knowing how many participants and
which participants are typically needed for good performance outcomes would be an important help in market
design.

Proposition 4:

When new, external information is available to all market traders, those traders
will differ in how that new external information impacts their trading behavior.

It is known that individuals are biased in their processing of information [Tversky and Kahneman 1974]. For
example, individuals may falsely believe that their preferences are widely held. A particular bias of interest to
information markets that operate over time concerns how individuals process new information in light of the prior
impressions and judgments. Currently, there is debate over the effects of assimilation (individuals are more
influenced by and process more completely new information that is consistent with prior belief) and contrast
(individuals are more influenced by and process more completely new information that is inconsistent with prior
belief). Research in a variety of settings provides support for both effects (e.g., Foti and Hauenstein [1993] in the
performance evaluation context); thus, the information market provides an ideal context in which to explore this
issue.

Proposition 5:

Idea markets designed for anonymous trading will generate more ideas and
greater participation than non-anonymous idea markets.

The prime motivation behind idea markets is to support brainstorming by as many people as possible, so that all
possible ideas, in particular those that represent ―out of the box thinking,‖ are raised. Anonymity as a design feature
can minimize trader fear of retribution for expressing or valuing ideas that go against the status quo [Hanson 2006].
However, in groups with communication channels outside the market, identity information may be shared (as in the
case of the GE Imagination Market [LaComb et al. 2007]). As mentioned earlier, this may be particularly important
in settings in which traders are from high-power distance cultures, in which individuals are likely to be more
deferential to those with higher rank in the organization [Hofstede 1991, 2001].
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Proposition 6:

The best method for determining the voice of the market will vary by type of
market.

As noted earlier, the best way to determine the voice of the market is a key challenge for the use of information
markets. There is considerable variety in the information markets currently in use in organizations. In a prediction
market used at Best Buy, a common approach was taken: the price of shares were restricted to between $0 and
$100 dollars, and the current stock price in a prediction was interpreted as an estimate of the probability of that
prediction [Dvorak 2008]. In the idea market used at GE, another common technique, volume-weighted price was
used to rank ideas, but those rankings were no better than leaders‘ expert ratings and rankings [LaComb et al.
2007]. In an event market in which there are established, discrete choices, as in the presidential election markets,
the voice of the market is the percentage of total number of choices made.

Proposition 7:

Software cost estimation using information markets will be more accurate than
existing methods of cost estimation.

In this research area, there are also important research questions related to the use of information markets in the IS
context. For example, Hastie [2001, p. 666] notes that the phenomenon of unrealistic optimism operates in only two
contexts, and one of them is ―judgments of cost and time to complete future multi-component projects.‖ Effort
estimation in software development may benefit from the predictive ability of information markets, with both event
markets and estimation markets being reasonable tools. The software industry has a long history of inaccurate or
inadequate estimation of the amount of effort required to complete projects. The Standish Group has tracked
software projects for the last two decades and their findings are dismal. Their 2006 CHAOS report indicates that
only 34 percent of software projects succeed, 51 percent came in late, over budget, or without the required
functionality, and 15 percent failed – cancelled or finished but never used [Standish Group International 2006].
Similarly, the Meta Group estimates only a 28 percent success rate [McBride 2005].
Experiments using groups of experts have resulted in more accurate and less biased estimates than single-expert
estimates [Jorgensen and Molokken 2004]. This same idea, harnessing the collective minds of many experts, is the
driving force behind the Delphi method. Information markets provide a way to assemble the various opinions and
judgments needed into a single estimation. The Milestone Market (www.MilestoneMarket.org) is a prototype project
management market built at the University of South Florida. The market is being used to experiment with many of
the research areas discussed in this paper, including the proposition that information markets are better than
existing software cost estimation methods, especially over the life of a project.
One of the markets used at Best Buy in 2007 and 2008 illustrates the usefulness of a market over time in project
estimation. In this interesting example, the likelihood of meeting the deadline began in December 2007 at 50
percent (share price at $50), but by late January, the share price fell as participants realized the difficulty in meeting
the deadline. In response to the market value of the deadline-meeting contract, Best Buy revised its rollout plan,
and by late February 2008, the share price of that contract had risen to $88.59, reflecting high confidence in meeting
the project deadline [Dvorak 2008].

V. CONCLUSIONS
This paper focuses on the emerging area of information markets that can be used to support large groups of
geographically dispersed decision makers. Information markets allow participants to buy and sell alternative
outcomes in an effort to aggregate the diverse opinions of all participants. These market-based decision-making
technologies have the potential of democratizing many decision-making activities, allowing highly diverse and widely
dispersed participants. The idea that a potentially large collection of individuals can outperform a few specialized
experts is still a somewhat radical proposition. However, there does seem to be many areas in which expertise has
limits. In fact, information markets bring the ―centralized planning‖ versus the ―invisible hand‖ to the realm of
decision making. While there are certainly areas that seem better suited to individual experts, information markets
and the wide-ranging information gathering activities of participants can be applied in many situations.
The information market typology presented at the beginning of the paper (see Figure 1) organizes several different
forms of market by the type of decision problem. Prediction markets, both discrete event-based markets and
estimation markets, focus on forecasting events that can be verified once the actual event occurs. Decision markets
are often used to choose among more complex alternatives and idea markets provide a market-based brainstorming
environment. Each of these markets require different mechanisms and trading interfaces for successful application.
In addition to the market typology, the key constructs in the information market research topology (Figure 2.)—
individual trader characteristics, organization characteristics, market environment, external information, market
design, trader behavior, and market outcomes—are identified and discussed. These constructs and their
relationships will vary depending on the information market context or application. A few research propositions are
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presented that describe how the research landscape model can be used to guide work on information markets.
These propositions include those directed at market technology design and applications in the MIS context, such as
software cost estimation. Information markets promise to bring a new perspective to many decision-making tasks.
A better understanding of trader characteristics, group dynamics in markets, and market design can help further
information market applications.
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